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Certainty and Uncertainty in Cap and Trade System or in Carbon Tax for Green Accounting
to Decrease Greenhouse gas Emissions
Haradhan Kumar Mohajan*
ABSTRACT
This  paper  analyzes  the  price  or  quantity  controls  of  greenhouse  gases  in  the  presence  of 
uncertain  costs.  The  greenhouse  gases  are  a  stock  pollutant  in  the  environment.  Hence,  the 
marginal benefit curve must be relatively flat which indicates to establish the preference of a price 
control  over a quantity control.  In the case of  permanent shocks,  the traditional  comparison of 
marginal  benefits  versus  marginal  costs  cannot  be  measured  accurately.  The  choice  between 
quantity and price controls becomes ambiguous and depends upon a more difficult measurement 
of marginal costs and benefits. The aim of the paper is to impose taxes to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.
JEL. Classification: F64; K23; L16; L24; L65
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1. INTRODUCTION
Finland  first  enacted  carbon  tax  in  1990  on  fuels,  and  then  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Denmark 
implemented carbon taxes in 1991 and 1992 (Anderson, Skou, Dengse and Pederson,  2000). 
Germany implemented an ecological tax on heating fuel, gasoline, natural gas, and electricity in 
1999 (IEA, 2007a). Japan enacted a tax on heavy polluting vehicles in 2001 but reduced the tax on 
low-pollution  vehicles  to  encourage  the  development  and  purchase  of  greener  vehicles  (IEA, 
2007b). In 2001 the UK implemented a climate change levy which adds about 15% to the cost of 
electricity (IEA, 2007c).  Hungary introduced a New Environmental  Burden Tariff  in  2004 which 
taxes pollution of the soil, air, and water (IEA, 2007d). Recently USA has established social cost of 
carbon (SCC) for analysis of federal regulations (IWGSCC, 2010).
At  present  there  are  two  classic  alternatives  for  regulating greenhouse gas  (GHG) emissions, 
which are a cap and trade policy, and a carbon tax policy. Cap and trade is a quantity control policy 
and carbon tax is a price control policy. The cap and trade system provides a price which is a 
secondary result of regulating the quantity of GHG emissions. On the other hand the carbon tax 
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effectively reduces the quantity of GHG emissions which is a secondary result of setting a price. To 
reduce  GHG  emissions  both  methods  contribute  and  in  idealized  circumstances  they  seem 
equivalent. If we think the policies in the economic view we observe that quantity control (in cap 
and trade policy) is preferable when the marginal benefits from price control (in carbon tax policy) 
are sharply sloping as compared against the marginal costs, but price control is preferable when 
marginal  benefits  are  relatively  flat  and marginal  costs  are  sharply  sloping (Newell  and Pizer, 
2006). Hence we observe that the marginal benefit function is flat but the marginal cost function 
slopes sharply (Nordhaus, 1994). The six gases; Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), sulphurhexafluouride (SF6), hydrofluourocarbon (HFC) and perfluourocarbon (PFC), 
together constitutes six GHG emissions. These six gases briefly called carbon dioxide equivalents 
(CO2e). The Kyoto Protocol 1997 has created an international market for allowances to emit six 
greenhouse gases but emphasis on carbon dioxide (CO2) (Mohajan, 2011b). At present the world 
carbon trade includes fulfillment markets in the EU, the USA, and New Zealand, representing over 
140 billion US dollars in traded value and as much as 5 gigatons of emissions per year (Linacre, 
Kossoy, and Ambrosi, 2011). To enlarge the world carbon trade with proposed markets in Australia 
and  Japan,  the  international  market  is  projected  to  reach  magnitudes  of  $2-3  trillion  by 2020 
(Lazarowicz, 2009; Calel, 2011)).  In post-Kyoto international framework the international carbon 
markets remain a key component of many countries’ carbon policy (EU, 2011).
The air pollution is the recognition that any meaningful climate change policy has to put a price on 
CO2 to decrease GHG emissions. Baumol and Oates (1988) proposed that pricing GHG emissions 
is a fundamental lesson from environmental economics and the theory of externalities. Mohajan 
(2011a) shows that the optimal environmental tax should be less than the marginal environmental 
damages.  Environmental  economists  suggest  that  the  absence  of  a  price  charge  for  scarce 
environmental resources such as clean air leads to air pollution (Chesney, Taschini and Wang, 
2011). The effects of GHG emissions are described in detail by Mohajan (2011b).
2.  CERTAINTY,  TEMPORARY  UNCERTAINTY  AND  PERMANENT  UNCERTAINTY  ON 
CARBON TAX
We divide a time horizon emissions into  T periods indexed by  i =1, 2,…,  T. Emissions in each 
period is denoted by iE . The Cost, C is an exponential function of emissions and a cost parameter 
α and can be expressed for period i as follows (Parsonsa and Taschini, 2011): 
       
                                                              ( ) iiEiii eEC αα −=, . (1)
The partial derivatives of (1) are marginal costs and can be written as;
                                                        ( ) iiEiii
i
eEC
E
αα −−=
∂
∂ , . (2)
The negative marginal cost indicates that the higher emissions yield lower cost. If we decrease 
emissions then abatement increases cost. The increase of the parameter  iE  changes the cost 
upward which also steeps the cost curve. As a result both the cost of abatement and the marginal 
cost of abatement increase. In this case we face uncertainty in the cost. Now we try to find two 
contrasting specifications of cost uncertainty as follows:
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• In first case, the shocks to the cost parameter are completely temporary or transitory. A 
shock affects the cost parameter in current period but it has no relation on the cost 
parameter in any future period.
• In the second case, shocks to the cost have a permanent affects. A shock affects the cost 
parameter in current period and the expected cost in all future periods is also incremented 
by the same amount.
The first specification of the cost parameter iα  is given by:
                                                                    ii i θνεαα  0 ++= , (3)
where 0α  is the starting cost parameter, ε is the constant expected growth rate in the mean cost 
parameter,  ν is  volatility  parameter  and  iθ  are  the shocks to  the cost  parameter  which  are 
independent standard normal random variables.
The second specification of the cost parameter iα  is given by:
 
                                                                  iii θνεαα  1 ++= − . (4)
Now we assume that a fixed aggregate emissions constraint is  E . Hence for T periods we can 
write;
                               
                                                                ∑
=
≤
T
i
i EE
1
. (5)
     
A dynamic emissions policy can be obtain by setting emissions in each period on some function of 
past  aggregate  emissions  and  on  the  current  value  of  the cost  parameter.  Let  the  remaining 
allowed emissions in period i is denoted by iE . Hence we can write for i = 1, 2,…, T-1 as follows:
                                                                  iii EEE −=+1 ,
(6)
where  ( )iiii EEE α,= . Now we assume that the value function in period  i is  iV . In the final 
period 
i = T, the total cost of remaining emissions to abate can be written as;
                                                      ( ) ( )( )TTTTTTTT EECEEV ααα , ,,, ≡ .
(7)
The value for the cost minimizing emissions level, ( )TTT EE α,*  becomes, 
   Certainty and Uncertainty in Cap and Trade System or in Carbon Tax….                                                                                Haradhan Kumar Mohajan110
Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 6(2):108-22 (Fall 2012)                                                       ideas.repec.org/s/iih/journl.html
                            
                                                                  ( )TTTTE EEVT α,,min (8)
subject to (5). The solution of the cost function takes the form;
                                                                     ( ) TTTT EEE =α,* . (9)
Let the optimize value at the final period be  *TV  which is a function of the remaining allowed 
emissions coming into the period T and the realized cost parameter in the period T can be written 
as;
                                          ( ) ( )( )TTTTTTTTT EEEVEV ααα , ,,, *** ≡
                                                               
                                                                = ( )( )TTTT EEC αα , ,*
                                                            
                                                                = ( )TTEC α,* . (10)
The marginal cost of emissions under the pollution policy (10) becomes;
                       ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )TTTTTTTT
T
TTT EECEECE
Ep ααααα , ,, , , *** =
∂
∂
−≡
(11)
where  ( )TTT Ep α,*  represents the price at the period T which is the negative of marginal cost. 
The logarithm of marginal cost for period i is defined by;
                                                                  **ln iii Ep −= α . (12)
 
Now for earlier periods, Ti <≤1 , the value function is the total cost of current period emissions 
plus the discounted expectation of the value function (
iα
δ ) in the subsequent period as follows: 
                        ( ) ( )( )iiiiiiii EECEEV ααα , ,,, ≡ + ( )( )( )11*1 , , +++ iiiii EEEVi αδα .
(13)
The cost minimizing emissions ( )iii EE α,*  becomes as follows:
                                                               ( )iiiiE EEVi α,,min . (14)
In this situation the optimal value function is given by;
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                                                      ( ) ( )( )iiiiiiiii EEEVEV ααα , ,,, ** ≡ , (15) 
and the marginal cost of emissions is given by;
      
                                   ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )iiiiiiii
i
iii EECEECE
Ep ααααα , ,, , , *** =
∂
∂
−≡ .
(16)
We now analyze the above solutions for different cases as follows:
2.1 Results in the Certainty Case
For convenient we use the backward programming starting from the end period that is we use 
index  j =  T, …, 2, 1. In the certainty case we use  0=ν , then the cost parameter follows the 
dynamics as below (Parsonsa and Taschini, 2011):
                                                           ( ) εαεαα  101 +−+=+=− jTjj , (17)
where  1+−= jTi . Now in the last period for j = 1, from (9) we get;
                                                                ( ) 111*1 , EEE =α . (18)
Hence from (10) and (1) the value function is given by;
                                                      ( ) ( ) *111111*1 ,, EeECEV −== ααα . (19)
For  j = 2 we can write;
                               ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]1221*1222222 , ,  , ,, 2 ααδα α EEEVeECEEV r−+=
                                                        
                                                       ( )( )22122 EErE eee −−−− += αα
                                                      
                                                       ( )( )22222 EErE eee −−+−− += εαα
                                                   
                                                       ( ) ( ){ }2222  EErE eeee −−−−− += εα . (20)
For the first order condition in the cost minimizing emissions we get;
                                 
( ) ( ){ } 0 *22*22
2
2
=+−=∂
∂
−−−−− EErE eeee
E
V εα
,
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                                                     ( ) ( ) 0*22*2 =+− −−−−− EErE eee ε ,
                   
                                                               ( ) 2*22 ErE eee −−−− = ε ,
                                                                   ( )rEE −−= ε
2
1 
2
1
2
*
2 . (21)
Then the optimized value function can be written as;
                                      ( ) ( )rEE eeEV −+−− == εααα 2121 2*2*2 22*22 22, .
(22)
For  j = 3 we can write;
                                ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] , ,  , ,, 2332*2333333 3 ααδα α EEEVeECEEV r−+=
                                    
                                                          



+=
+−−
−
−− 2
 332
3
33 2 
rEE
rE eee
ε
α
α
α δ
                                                          2  2
1 33
2
2
3
3
33  2
rEE
rE eee
+−−
−+−+
−− +=
εθννεα
α
α δ
                                                          ( )2
3
2
3
33
33  2
1
2
 
 2 θνα
νεα
ε
α δ eeeeee
rEE
rE −+
+−−
−
−− +=
                                                         

 +=
+−−
−
− 2
33
 33
33 2
rEE
E eee
ε
α . (23)
For the first order condition in the cost minimizing emissions we get;
                                               02 2
33 
3
3
*
33
*
33
=





+=
∂
∂ +−−−
−
rEE
E eee
E
V εα ,
                                                                 02 2
33
 
*
33
*
3
=+−
+−−
−
−
rEE
E ee
ε
,
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2
33*33*
3
rEEE +−−= ε ,
                                                                   ( )rEE −−= ε
2
2 
3
1
3
*
3 . (24)
Then the optimized value function can be written as;
                                                     ( ) ( )rEE eeEV −+−− == εααα 2131 3*3*3 33*33 33, .                        
For  j = 4 we can write;
                                             ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] , ,  , ,, 3443*3444444 4 ααδα α EEEVeECEEV r−+=
                                                                    



+=
+−−
−
−− 3
33
 443
4
44 3 
rEE
rE eee
ε
α
α
α δ
                                                                    3
33
  
2
1 44
4
2
4
4
44  3
rEE
rE eee
+−−
−+−+
−− +=
εθννεα
α
α δ
                                                                     ( )3
4
2
4
44
44  2
1
3
33
 
 3 θνα
ν
εα
ε
α δ eeeeee
rEE
rE −+
+−−
−
−− +=
                                                                     

 +=
+−−
−
− 3
6644
44 3
rEE
E eee
ε
α . (25) 
 For the first order condition in the cost minimizing emissions we get;
                                                          03 3
66
4
4
*
44
*
44
=





+=∂
∂ +−−−
−
rEE
E eee
E
V εα ,
                                                                              03 4
66*44
*
4
=+−
+−−
−
−
rEE
E ee
ε
,
                                                                                    
3
66*44*
4
rEEE +−−= ε ,
                                                                                    ( )rEE −−= ε
2
3 
4
1
4
*
4 . (26)
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Then the optimized value function can be written as;
                                                         ( ) ( )rEE eeEV −+−− == εααα 23414*4*4 44*44 44, . (27)
Proceeding such a way we can write the general form of the optimal policy as follows:
                                                           ( ) ( )rjEjE jj −−−= ε 12
1 1* . (28)
In calendar time i for 1+−= iTj , (28) can be written as;
                                          ( ) ( )riTE
iT
E ii −−−+−
= ε 
2
1 
1
1* . (29)
 The general form of the optimized form can be written as follows:  
                                ( ) ( ) ( )rjEjEjjj jjjj jejeEV −−+−− == εααα 12
11
** *, .
(30)
In calendar time i for 1+−= iTj  we can write (30) as;
                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )riTEiTEiii iiii eiTeiEV −−++−−− +−== εααα  2
1
1
1 **  1 ,
* . (31)
From (12) the logarithm of marginal cost function becomes;
                                        ( ) ( )riTE
iT
p iii −−++−
−= εα  
2
1 
1
1ln * . (32)     
In the certainty case we can translate back to an equation that describes emissions in different 
periods, i = 1, 2, . . . , T, which is a function of the total allowed emissions iE , the total number of 
periods T, the rate of growth in the cost parameter ε  and the discount rate r . Hence we can write 
such an equation by (29) as follows:
                       
                                           ( ) ( ) ( )rirTE
T
rTEEi −+−−= εεε  2
1,,,* . (33)
By using (3), equation (32) can be expressed as follows:
                               ( ) ( ) irrE
T
irTEpi +−+−+= εεαε 2
1 1,,,ln 0
* . (34)
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The emissions increase linearly through time at the rate ( )r−ε   which is shown in (33). So that 
the marginal cost of abatement grows at the discount rate  r  which is shown in equation (34).  If 
r≥ε  and the related cost parameter is growing at a rate greater than the discount rate, then this 
adjustment leads to reducing the rate of emissions in current period i. This indicates that increasing 
the realized marginal cost at present to preserve allowed emissions for the later periods when the 
cost parameter is higher. As a result we have to reduce the growth rate in the realized marginal 
cost to equal the discount rate.
2.2   Results in the Temporary Shock Case
If the per period shock is temporary the cost parameter follows the dynamics as  (Parsonsa and 
Taschini 2011);
                                      jjj θνα  +=Ψ  where ε+= +1jj ΨΨ . (35)
In the backward programming for j = 1 we have the same result of (18) and (19). For j = 2, we get 
from (13);  
                               ( ) ( )( )221
2
222  
2222 ,,
EErE eeeEEV −−−−+ += αα
θν δα Ψ       
          
                                                      ( )( )2211
2
222   EErE eee −−+Ψ−−+ += θνα
θν δΨ
                                                      ( ) ( )1222222   θννθν δ eeeee EErE +Ψ−−−−+ += Ψ
                                                      ( )



+= −−



−−−
− 22
2
222 2
1 
 EE
r
E eeee
νεθνΨ . (36)       
  
  For the first order condition in the cost minimizing emissions we get;
                                                  =∂
∂
2
2
E
V ( ) 0*22
2
*
222 2
1 
 
=




+− −−



−−−
− EE
r
E eeee
νεθνΨ ,
  
                                           ( )*222*22 2
1 
 EE
r
E eee −−



−−−
−
=−
νεθν ,
      
                                            *22
2*
22 2
1 EErE +−


−−−=− νενθ ,
                  
                                                      ( ) 222*2 2
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
νθνε +−−−= rEE . (37) 
Then the optimized value function can be written as;
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                                   ( ) ( ) 2222*22  2141212122*2 22, θννεααα −+−+−− == rEE eeEV .
(38)
For j = 3 from (13) we have,  
                             ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] , ,  , ,, 2332*2333333 3 ααδα α EEEVeECEEV r−+=
                                    
                                                   







+=
+−+−−
−
−− 2
 
2
1
 
2
2
33
2
3
33 2 
θννε
α
α
α δ
rEE
rE eee
                                                    







+=
+−+−−
−+
−−+ 2
 
2
1
   
2
2
33
22
3
333 2 
θννε
θν
α
θν δ
rEE
rE eee
ΨΨ
                                                    



+=
−+
+−+−−
−
−−
2
23
2
2
33
333
 
2
1
  2
 
2
1
   2
θνθνν
θννε
θν δ eeeeeee
rEE
rE ΨΨ
                                                    








+=
−+−−
−
− 2
4
333
  
2
33
333 2
νε
θν
rEE
E eeeΨ . (39)
For the first order condition in the cost minimizing emissions we get;
                                              =∂
∂
3
3
E
V
02
4
333
  
2*
33
*
333
=








+−
−+−−
−
−
νε
θν
rEE
E eeeΨ ,
                                         
2
4
333
 
2*
33
*
33
νε
θν
−+−−
−
−
=
rEE
E ee
,
   
                                 


−+−−=− 2*333
*
3 4
333
2
1 ννθν rEEE ,    
                                   
                                                ( ) 323*3  3
2
4
1
2
2
3
1 θννε −−−−= rEE . (40)        
        
Then the optimized value function can be written as;
                                ( ) ( ) 3233*33  32412133*3 32, θννεααα ++−+−− == rEE eeEV . (41) 
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For j = 4 from (13) we have,  
                            ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] , ,  , ,, 3443*3444444 4 ααδα α EEEVeECEEV r−+=
                                  
                                                   







+=
−−+−−
−
−− 3
 2
4
333
 
3
2
44
3
4
44 3 
θννε
α
α
α δ
rEE
rE eee
                                                   







+=
−−+−−
−+
−−+ 3
 2
4
333
   
3
2
44
33
4
444  3
θννε
θν
α
θν δ
rEE
rE eee
ΨΨ
                                                   



+=
−
+
−−+−−
−
−−
3
34
3
2
44
444
 
3
2
  3
 2
4
333
   3
θνθνν
θννε
θν δ eeeeeee
rEE
rE ΨΨ
                                                    








+=
−+−−
−
− 3
12
1166
  
2
44
444 3
νε
θν
rEE
E eeeΨ . (42)
For the first order condition in the cost minimizing emissions we get;
                                               =∂
∂
3
3
E
V
03
12
1166
  
2*
44
*
444
=








+−
−+−−
−
−
νε
θν
rEE
E eeeΨ ,
                                         
3
12
1166
   
2*
44
*
44
νε
θν
−+−−
−
−
=
rEE
E ee
,
                                     


−+−−=− 2*444
*
4 12
1166 
3
1 νεθν rEEE ,
                                                ( ) 424*4  4
3
48
11
2
3
4
1 θννε −−−−= rEE . (43)
Then the optimized value function can be written as;
                                   ( ) ( ) 3244*44  434811234144*4 44, θννεααα ++−+−− == rEE eeEV .
(44) 
Proceeding such a way we can write the general form of the optimal policy as follows:
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                                   ( ) ( ) jjjj j
jrjXE
j
E θνεν  1 1
2
11 2* −+−−−−= , (45)
where ( ) 



−
+
−
=
− 2 1 12
11
j
X
j
jX jj ,  for j = 2, 3,...,T  and 01 =X . (46)    
In calendar period i for 1+−= iTj ,  (45) and (46) can be written as;
                       ( ) ( ) iiii iT
iTriTXE
iT
E θνεν  
1
 
2
1
1
1 2*
+−
−
+−−−−
+−
= , and (47) 
                      ( ) 



−
+
+−
−
= + 2 1 2
1
1 iT
X
iT
iTX ii ,  for i = 2, 3,...,T-1  and 0=TX . (48)    
The generalized form of the optimized value function can be written as;
        ( ) ( ) ( ) jjEjEjj j
jrjXjejeEV
jj
jj θνεν
α
α  1 1
2
12
1
* * −
−−−++==
−
− . (49)
In calendar period i for 1+−= iTj ,  (49) can be written as;
          ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiiii iT iTriTXEiTEii ieieEV θνεναα  1 2
1
1
1
*
2
*
+−
−
−−−++
+−
−
−
==
. (50)
Operating logarithm on (50) we get;
       ( ) ( ) ( ) iiiii iT
iTriTXE
iT
p θνενα  
1
 
2
1
1
1ln 2*
+−
−
−−−++
+−
−= (51)
                 ( ) ( ) iiii iT
iTriTXE
iT
i θνενθνεα  
1
 
2
1
1
1 20 +−
−
−−−++
+−
−++=
                 ( ) ( ) iii iTriTXEiTi θνενεα  1
1 
2
1
1
1 2
0 +−
−−−++
+−
−+= . (52)
We observe that the optimal emissions policy in (47) is similar to the certainty case in favor of rate 
share of the remaining allowances  iEiT 1
1
+−
 and the linear growth factor  ( ) ( )riT −− ε 
2
1
. 
Also there is a deduction in the current emissions level 2νiX , which is tied to the overall volatility 
of emissions. Again there is the component of emissions that fluctuates with the current realization 
of costs iiT
iT θν 
1+−
−
. If the remaining number of periods is large, then the coefficient is close to 
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1. This indicates that all of the volatility in the cost parameter is absorbed in adjustment to the 
current level of emissions which keeps the current level of marginal cost approximately constant. 
Since the remaining number of periods decline, the coefficient on the quantity adjustment decline. 
Hence only a portion of the volatility in the cost parameter is absorbed in adjustment to the current 
level of emissions, because the aggregate emissions are constraint. If there are fewer remaining 
periods to share the remaining costs, a larger fraction must be absorbed in the current period. As a 
result  the  final  period  shows  the  price  begins  to  reflect  a  portion  of  the  volatility  of  the  cost 
parameter.
2.3 Results in the Permanent Uncertainty Case
If the per period’s shock is permanent the general forms are the same as uncertain case and we 
obtain here the relations are the same as equations (28) to (34). The optimal emissions policy in 
(29) is identical to the certainty case. But here emissions are completely unresponsive to shocks to 
the cost parameter. Since none of the cost uncertainty is absorbed by the quantity of emissions, all 
of the cost uncertainty must be absorbed by the price of (34). It is the best policy since the GHGs 
are a stock pollutant therefore the optimal policy must be a price control. Weitzman’s (Weitzman 
1974) original paper was about a policy maker which was uninformed about cost but the producer 
was  informed.  Parsonsa  and  Taschini  (2011)  show that  the  volatility  of  emissions  and of  the 
logarithm price one period in temporary uncertainty are as follows:
  
                                ( ) ν
1
*
1 +−
−
=
− iT
iTEVar ii   and  ( ) ν11ln *1 +−=− iTEVar ii .
(53)
But they show the corresponding results in permanent uncertainty case are as follows:
                                                 ( ) 0*1 =− ii EVar  and  ( ) ν=− *1 ln ii EVar .
(54)
The two cases (53) and (54) gives the difference between uncertainties in cost should have upon 
the cost minimizing emissions path depending upon whether it  is  a temporary uncertainty or a 
permanent  uncertainty.  In  the  temporary  case  uncertainty  is  the  quantity  of  emissions  which 
absorbs shocks to the cost parameter but the price of emissions is relatively constant. In the case 
of permanent uncertainty the quantity is constant and it is price that absorbs shocks to the cost 
parameter (Parsonsa and Taschini,  2011). Greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant so that the 
optimal policy must be a price control which only corresponds with the temporary uncertainty case. 
In the case of permanent uncertainty, a price control will clearly not be optimal as it is the price that 
ought to absorb all of the shocks to cost. 
Economists always tell casually of a cap and trade system as being a quantity control and a carbon 
tax a price control. In real life a cap and trade system allows banking and borrowing of allowances 
across  periods  can  mimic  the  benefits  of  a  price  control.  If  the  cap  and  trade  system faces 
temporary uncertainty in costs, then it will be the period by period quantity of emissions which will 
fluctuate under the cap and trade system, and the price will be relatively constant. If the cap and 
trade system faces permanent uncertainty in costs, then it will be the period by period price which 
will fluctuate under the cap and trade system, and the quantity of emissions in each period will not 
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be stochastic, but rise deterministically at the rate of growth in costs less the interest rate. 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have shown stocks and shocks for GHG over price and quantity controls. We have 
discussed both the certainty and uncertainty in carbon tax or cap and trade system. Recently the 
global climate change has become the headache of the environment analysts, the economists and 
the governments of the all nations. Hence there are no alternatives of reductions of greenhouse 
gases which cause the global warming. Throughout the paper the mathematical calculations are 
given in some details.    
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